Contingent Control Rights and Managerial Incentives: The Design of Long-term Debt
Enterprises, small or large, rely heavily on long-term financing arrangements to fund their operations. However, it has proved difficult for financial theory to justify the use of long-term contracts when the manager has the ability to divert or manipulate the cash flows, and when it is prohibitively costly for a third party, such as a court, to verify or prove any managerial wrongdoing. Why would investors enter into financial contracts that extend beyond the life of the firm's existing physical assets when such
|Date of creation:||01 Nov 1999|
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