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Technical Efficiency Under Alternative Regulatory Regimes: Evidence from the Inter-War Britich Gas Industry

Listed author(s):
  • Hammond, C.J.
  • Jones, G.
  • Robinson, T.

From 1920 until nationalisation, privately owned gas companies in Britain were regulated under one of three systems: the Maximum Price, the Sliding Scale, or the Basic Price system. In effect, the industry was the subject of a remarkable experiment in regulation. Hitherto, there has been no empirical analysis of the incentive properties of the regimes applied. This paper attempts such an investigation by using Data Envelopment Analysis to estimate the relative efficiency of a sample of undertakings under each system. Undertakings operating under the basic price system are found to be more efficient which suggests that incentive regulation was effective in the industry at this time.

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Paper provided by Universite de Nantes - Economie Internationale et de l'Entreprise in its series Papers with number 280.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Handle: RePEc:fth:nantie:280
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Universite de Nantes, Centre d'Etudes sur l'Economie Internationale et l'Entreprise. 110, Bd. Michelet 44071 Nantes CEDEX 03 France.

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