Arbitrage and Endogenous Market Integration
We analyse a general equilibrium model of strategic arbitraging and intermediation. Arbitrageurs take advantage of mispricings, market frictions and manipulation opportunities in order to maximise profits. We analyse the effects of increased competition among arbitrageurs due to lower entry costs. Typically, markets become more liquid and integrated, and Cournot-Walas equilibria converge to Walrasian equilibria, though not uniformly: mispricings persist longer on shallow markets. We also provide a class of economies where the limiting equilibria are neither integrated nor Walrasian. Furthermore, we show that the asset pricing implications for financial innovations are quite different from standard models.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp319. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (The FMG Administration)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.