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On the implementation of Markov-Perfect interest rate and money supply rules : global and local uniqueness

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  • Michael Dotsey
  • Andreas Hornstein

Abstract

Currently there is a growing literature exploring the features of optimal monetary policy in New Keynesian models under both commitment and discretion. This literature usually solves for the optimal allocations that are consistent with a rational expectations market equiibrium, but it does not study how the policy can be implemented given the available policy instruments. Recently, however, King and Wolman (2004) have shown that a time-consistent policy cannot be implemented through the control of nominal money balances. In particular, they find that equilibria are not unique under a money stock regime. We find that their conclusion of non-uniqueness of Markov-perfect equilibria is sensitive to the instrument of choice. Surprisingly, if, instead, the monetary authority chooses the nominal interest rate, there exists a unique Markov-perfect equilibrium. We then investigate under what conditions a time-consistent planner can implement the optimal allocation by simply announcing his policy rule in a decentralized setting.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Dotsey & Andreas Hornstein, 2011. "On the implementation of Markov-Perfect interest rate and money supply rules : global and local uniqueness," Working Paper 09-06, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedrwp:09-06
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Carlstrom, Charles T. & Fuerst, Timothy S., 2001. "Timing and real indeterminacy in monetary models," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 285-298, April.
    2. McCallum, Bennett T., 1983. "On non-uniqueness in rational expectations models : An attempt at perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 139-168.
    3. Charles T. Carlstrom & Timothy S. Fuerst, 1998. "Price-level and interest-rate targeting in a model with sticky prices," Working Paper 9819, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    4. Bernardino Adão & Isabel Correia & Pedro Teles, 2003. "Gaps and Triangles," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(4), pages 699-713.
    5. Robert G. King & Alexander L. Wolman, 2004. "Monetary Discretion, Pricing Complementarity, and Dynamic Multiple Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(4), pages 1513-1553.
    6. John H. Boyd & Michael Dotsey, 1990. "Interest rate rules and nominal determinacy," Working Paper 90-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    7. Andrew Atkeson & V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2007. "On the Optimal Choice of a Monetary Policy Instrument," NBER Working Papers 13398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. King, Robert G. & Wolman, Alexander L., 2004. "Monetary discretion, pricing complementarity and dynamic multiple equilibria," Working Paper Series 343, European Central Bank.
    9. Marc P. Giannoni & Michael Woodford, 2003. "Optimal Interest-Rate Rules: I. General Theory," NBER Working Papers 9419, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Sargent, Thomas J & Wallace, Neil, 1975. ""Rational" Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(2), pages 241-254, April.
    11. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dennis, Richard & Kirsanova, Tatiana, 2010. "Expectations Traps and Coordination Failures: Selecting among Multiple Discretionary Equilibria," MPRA Paper 24616, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Stefan Niemann & Paul Pichler & Gerhard Sorger, 2013. "Central Bank Independence And The Monetary Instrument Problem," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54, pages 1031-1055, August.
    3. Willem Van Zandweghe & Alexander L. Wolman, 2010. "Discretionary monetary policy in the Calvo model," Research Working Paper RWP 10-06, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.

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    Keywords

    Monetary policy ; Interest rates;

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