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A limited central bank

Author

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  • Charles I. Plosser

Abstract

Cato Institute's 31st Annual Monetary Conference ? Was The Fed a Good Idea? November 14, 2013, Washington, D.C.> President Charles I. Plosser proposes setting limits on the Federal Reserve so that it can better fulfill what he believes is its essential role. He considers restrictions on the types of assets the Fed can buy to limit its interference with markets. He also touches on the Fed's governance and accountability and ways to implement policies that limit discretion and improve outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles I. Plosser, 2013. "A limited central bank," Speech 86, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpsp:86
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    File URL: https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/frbp/assets/institutional/speeches/plosser/2013/11-13-13_cato-institute.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Charles I. Plosser, 2008. "The benefits of systematic monetary policy: a speech presented to the National Association for Business Economics, Washington Economic Policy Conference, March 3, 2008," Speech 14, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    2. Daniel L. Thornton, 2012. "The dual mandate: has the Fed changed its objective?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 94(Mar), pages 117-134.
    3. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Cyril Monnet & Hyun Song Shin & Jon Frost & Leonardo Gambacorta & Raphael Auer & Tara Rice, 2022. "Central Bank Digital Currencies: Motives, Economic Implications, and the Research Frontier," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 14(1), pages 697-721, August.
    2. Sumner, Scott, 2017. "Monetary policy rules in light of the great recession," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 54(PA), pages 90-99.
    3. Dionysopoulos, Lambis & Marra, Miriam & Urquhart, Andrew, 2024. "Central bank digital currencies: A critical review," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    4. Donato Masciandaro & Francesco Passarelli, 2018. "Populism, Financial Inequality And Central Bank Independence: A Political Economics Approach," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1874, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    5. Cochrane, John H., 2014. "Monetary policy with interest on reserves," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 74-108.
    6. Federico Faveretto & Donato Masciandaro, 2018. "Financial Inequality, group entitlements and populism," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1892, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    7. Donato Masciandaro, 2019. "Populism, Economic Policies, Political Pressure And Central Bank (In)Dependence," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19111, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Federal Reserve System; Monetary policy;

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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