Insider trading and the problem of corporate agency
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- Noe, Thomas H, 1997. "Insider Trading and the Problem of Corporate Agency," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 287-318, October.
References listed on IDEAS
- repec:aei:rpbook:53302 is not listed on IDEAS
- Ausubel, Lawrence M, 1990. "Insider Trading in a Rational Expectations Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1022-1041.
- Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, 1992. "Insider Trading and the Efficiency of Stock Prices," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 106-122.
- Michael Manove, 1989. "The Harm from Insider Trading and Informed Speculation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(4), pages 823-845.
- Anat R. Admati, Paul Pfleiderer, 1988. "A Theory of Intraday Patterns: Volume and Price Variability," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, pages 3-40.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Chih-Jen Huang, 2010. "The joint decision to manage earnings through discretionary accruals and asset sales around insider trading: Taiwan evidence," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 34(3), pages 308-325, July.
- Leonard F.S. Wang & Ya-Chin Wang, 2010. "Stackelberg real-leader in an insider trading model," Studies in Economics and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 27(1), pages 30-46, March.
- Jie Hu & Thomas H. Noe, 1997. "The insider trading debate," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, pages 34-45.
- Brenner, Steffen, 2011. "On the irrelevance of insider trading for managerial compensation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 293-303, February.
- Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Jolls, Christine, 1999. "Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(2), pages 487-502, July.
- Jan Zabojnik, 2014. "Stock-based Compensation Plans and Employee Incentives," Working Papers 1325, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- P. J. Engelen & L. Liedekerke, 2006. "An Ethical Analysis of Regulating Insider Trading," Working Papers 06-05, Utrecht School of Economics.
- Maug, Ernst, 2002. "Insider trading legislation and corporate governance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(9), pages 1569-1597, October.
- Hu, Jie & Noe, Thomas H., 2001. "Insider trading and managerial incentives," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 681-716, April.
- Dewally, Michaël & Peck, Sarah W., 2010. "Upheaval in the boardroom: Outside director public resignations, motivations, and consequences," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 38-52, February.
- Chang, Millicent & Watson, Iain, 2015. "Delayed disclosure of insider trades: Incentives for and indicators of future performance?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, pages 182-197.
- Laura Beny, 2006. "Do Investors Value Insider Trading Laws? International Evidence," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp837, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Jie Hu & Thomas H. Noe, 1997. "Insider trading, costly monitoring, and managerial incentives," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 97-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
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