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Defying the 'Juncker Curse': Can Reformist Governments Be Re-elected?

Author

Listed:
  • Marco Buti
  • Alessandro Turrini
  • Paul Van den Noord
  • Pietro Biroli

Abstract

European policy makers, notably in the euro area, seem to take for granted that the electorate will punish them for bold reform in product and labour markets. This may explain why progress in the euro area has been comparatively limited. This paper posits and, using a dataset for 21 OECD countries, shows that this fear of electoral backlashes is unfounded, provided that financial markets work well. The mechanisms involved are relatively straightforward: well functioning financial markets "bring forward" future yields of structural reform to the present, thus permitting to overcome possible short-run costs. As a result, the electorate tend to reward, not punish, reformist governments. This has important implications for the design of structural reform packages, with financial market reforms being an essential ingredient beside product and labour market reforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Buti & Alessandro Turrini & Paul Van den Noord & Pietro Biroli, 2008. "Defying the 'Juncker Curse': Can Reformist Governments Be Re-elected?," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 324, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    • Handle: RePEc:euf:ecopap:0324
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    Cited by:

    1. Vincenzo Galasso, 2013. "Getting Fitter," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 14(03), pages 25-34, October.
    2. Piera Bello & Vincenzo Galasso, 2021. "The politics of ageing and retirement: Evidence from Swiss referenda," Population Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 75(1), pages 3-18, January.
    3. Vincenzo Galasso, 2014. "The role of political partisanship during economic crises," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 143-165, January.
    4. Lucifora, Claudio & Moriconi, Simone, 2015. "Political instability and labour market institutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 201-221.
    5. Elsa Fornero, 2015. "Economic-financial Literacy and (Sustainable) Pension Reforms: Why the Former is a Key Ingredient for the Latter," Bankers, Markets & Investors, ESKA Publishing, issue 134, pages 6-16, January-F.
    6. Favero, Carlo A. & Galasso, Vincenzo, 2015. "Demographics and the Secular Stagnation Hypothesis in Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 10887, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. István P. Székely & Melanie Ward-Warmedinger, 2018. "Reform Reversals: Areas, Circumstances and Motivations," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 60(4), pages 559-582, December.
    8. Alberto Alesina & Dorian Carloni & Giampaolo Lecce, 2012. "The Electoral Consequences of Large Fiscal Adjustments," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis, pages 531-570, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Jante Parlevliet, 2017. "What drives public acceptance of reforms? Longitudinal evidence from a Dutch pension reform," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 1-23, October.
    10. Jacques Pelkmans & Lourdes Acedo Montoya & Alessandro Maravalle, 2008. "How product market reforms lubricate shock adjustment in the euro area," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 341, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    11. Andrzej Torój & Elżbieta Bednarek & Joanna Bęza-Bojanowska & Joanna Osińska & Katarzyna Waćko & Dariusz Witkowski, 2012. "EMU: the (post-)crisis perspective. Literature survey and implications for the euro-candidates," MF Working Papers 12, Ministry of Finance in Poland.
    12. Ágota Scharle & Balázs Váradi & Flóra Samu, 2015. "Policy Convergence Across Welfare Regimes: The Case of Disability Policies. WWWforEurope Working Paper No. 76," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 50914, August.
    13. Martin Larch & Paul van den Noord & Lars Jonung, 2010. "The Stability and Growth Pact: Lessons from the Great Recession," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 429, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    14. Paul den Noord, 2011. "Turning the page? EU fiscal consolidation in the wake of the crisis," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 19-51, February.
    15. Tolga Aksoy, 2016. "The Political Economy Of Structural Reforms," Ekonomi-tek - International Economics Journal, Turkish Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 25-69, January.

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    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

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