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Agenda Setting Power in Organizations with Overlapping Generations of Players

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  • Muthoo, Abhinay
  • Shepsle, Kenneth

Abstract

This paper presents an analysis of the allocation of agenda-setting (or bargaining) power in organizations with overlapping generations of players. Such powers are typically institutionalized within an organization’s structure, and, given the focus of this paper, we identify the former with the latter. Our analysis concerns organizations (such as the US Senate) in which the number of periods each player participates is endogenously determined by his or her past performance. We derive several results and insights concerning (i) optimal organizational structure and (ii) conditions under which the unique, dynamically optimal outcome can be sustained (in equilibrium) in organizations with suboptimal structures. For example, we show that under a broad set of conditions, the optimal organizational structure should involve a seniority system, in which most of the agenda-setting power is allocated to the oldest generation of players.

Suggested Citation

  • Muthoo, Abhinay & Shepsle, Kenneth, 2003. "Agenda Setting Power in Organizations with Overlapping Generations of Players," Economics Discussion Papers 8856, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:esx:essedp:8856
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Richard D. Mckelvey & Raymond Riezman, 2013. "Seniority in Legislature," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Raymond Riezman (ed.), International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 12, pages 185-199, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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    3. Sahuguet, Nicolas & Conconi, Paola, 2005. "Re-election Incentives and the Sustainability of International Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 5401, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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