Designing Economic Instruments and Participatory Institutions for Environmental Management in India
This paper examines the possibility of using economic instruments, especially pollution taxes and bargaining approaches, as a means to encourage or improve peopleâ€™s participation in environmental management in India. It provides an intuitive description of methods for designing economic instruments and bargaining approaches. A case study describes the estimation of pollution taxes for controlling air pollution in thermal power generation in India. Another case study examining some bargaining methods that are already in force in India shows their usefulness in controlling industrial pollution. [SANDEE Working Paper No. 48-10]
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- JAY S. COGGINS & John R. Swinton, 1994.
"The Price of Pollution: A Dual Approach to Valuing SO2 Allowances,"
Wisconsin-Madison Agricultural and Applied Economics Staff Papers
378, Wisconsin-Madison Agricultural and Applied Economics Department.
- Coggins, Jay S. & Swinton, John R., 1996. "The Price of Pollution: A Dual Approach to Valuing SO2Allowances," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 58-72, January.
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