Monitoring and monetary incentives in addressing absenteeism: evidence from a sequence of policy changes
Exploiting three variations in sickness absence policy for civil servants in Italy, this paper assesses the importance of monitoring and monetary incentives in addressing absenteeism. Sickness absence is sensitive to monitoring intervals for random inspections, while moderate monetary incentives are relatively less effective. Results are not driven by attenuation bias, while a falsification test shows that, out of the 13 semesters analysed in this study, the only significant changes in relative public/private sector absence rates were observed in the three semesters in which stricter monitoring determined substantial increases in attendance.
|Date of creation:||08 Apr 2011|
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- Maria De Paola & Valeria Pupo & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2009. "Absenteeism In The Italian Public Sector: The Effects Of Changes In Sick Leave Compensation," Working Papers 200916, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza (Ex Dipartimento di Economia e Statistica).
- Alessandra Del Boca & Maria Laura Parisi, 2010. "Why does the private sector react like the public to law 133? A microeconometric analysis of sickness absence in Italy," Working Papers 1008, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
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