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The Importance of Being Nice: An Institutionalist Analysis of French Preferences on the Future of Europe

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  • Nicolas Jabko

Abstract

This article offers an institutionalist explanation of French preferences on the future of Europe from the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 through the Constitutional Treaty of 2004. It argues that the autonomous institutional logic of the constitution-drafting exercise increasingly shaped the evolution of French preferences. More specifically, the French Government’s preferences reflected its acceptance of the European Union’s new method of debate at the Convention, the contingency of a revived alliance with Germany in that debate, and the legacy of a half century of European integration. Beneath the surface, this autonomous institutionalist logic offset French leaders’ aspirations to maximize national power interests, to improve decision-making efficiency, and to achieve their ideal visions of Europe. Domestic politics also played a relatively unimportant role because the French constitution enabled the president to discount domestic coalition-building considerations. Altogether, this argument suggests that state preferences cannot be understood in isolation from the international and domestic institutional environment in which they are formed.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Jabko, 2004. "The Importance of Being Nice: An Institutionalist Analysis of French Preferences on the Future of Europe," Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po 2, Centre d'études européennes (CEE) at Sciences Po, Paris.
    • Handle: RePEc:erp:scpoxx:p0014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Andrew Moravcsik & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, 1999. "Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(1), pages 59-85, March.
    2. Hug, Simon & König, Thomas, 2002. "In View of Ratification: Governmental Preferences and Domestic Constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(2), pages 447-476, April.
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