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An Approach to the stability of international environmental agreements: the absorbing sets solution

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  • Olaizola Ortega, María Norma

Abstract

We study international environmental negotiations when agreements between countries can not be binding. A problem with this kind of negotiations is that countries have incentives for free-riding from such agreements. We develope a notion of equilibrium based on the assumption that countries can create and dissolve agreements in their seeking of a larger welfare. This approach leads to a larger degree of cooperation compared to models based on the internal-external stability approach.

Suggested Citation

  • Olaizola Ortega, María Norma, 2003. "An Approach to the stability of international environmental agreements: the absorbing sets solution," IKERLANAK 2003-10, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehu:ikerla:6497
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sylvie Thoron, 1998. "Formation of a Coalition-Proof Stable Cartel," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(1), pages 63-76, February.
    2. Elena Inarra & Jeroen Kuipers & N. Olaizola, 2005. "Absorbing and generalized stable sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(3), pages 433-437, June.
    3. Kalai, Ehud & Pazner, Elisha A & Schmeidler, David, 1976. "Collective Choice Correspondences as Admissible Outcomes of Social Bargaining Processes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(2), pages 233-240, March.
    4. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
    5. Iñarra García, María Elena & Kuipers, Jerome & Olaizola Ortega, María Norma, 2001. "Absorbing Sets in Coalitional Systems," BILTOKI 2002-01, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Economía Aplicada III (Econometría y Estadística).
    6. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 30-78.
    7. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Coalitional Power and Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, pages 1355-1384.
    8. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    international environmental agreements; absorbing sets solution;

    JEL classification:

    • Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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