An Approach to the stability of international environmental agreements: the absorbing sets solution
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References listed on IDEAS
- Sylvie Thoron, 1998. "Formation of a Coalition-Proof Stable Cartel," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(1), pages 63-76, February.
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More about this item
Keywordsinternational environmental agreements; absorbing sets solution;
- Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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