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On the growing dangers of money in American democracy

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  • Larcinese, Valentino

Abstract

Democratic politics requires balancing a trade-off between equality and liberty. The current US campaign finance system, shaped largely by a series of Supreme Court decisions, has prioritized liberty, particularly through a questionable interpretation of money as speech As a result of these rulings, money from individuals, corporations, and unions can flow to candidates without regulation, restriction, or, in some cases, transparency (through “dark money”) Although it is challenging to establish direct causal effects, growing evidence suggests that money does influence politicians. Moreover, through issue advertising, financial contributions shape the political agenda and influence the salience of certain issues in public debate This dynamic has significant implications for the policies produced by the American political system. Wealthy donors tend to be substantially more conservative on economic issues than the general population Campaign finance reform is one of the most pressing challenges facing the future of US democracy and requires urgent attention
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Suggested Citation

  • Larcinese, Valentino, 2024. "On the growing dangers of money in American democracy," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 125781, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:125781
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/125781/
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alexander Fouirnaies & Andrew B. Hall, 2018. "How Do Interest Groups Seek Access to Committees?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 62(1), pages 132-147, January.
    2. David E. Broockman & Gregory Ferenstein & Neil Malhotra, 2019. "Predispositions and the Political Behavior of American Economic Elites: Evidence from Technology Entrepreneurs," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 63(1), pages 212-233, January.
    3. Cohn, Alain & Jessen, Lasse J. & Klašnja, Marko & Smeets, Paul, 2023. "Wealthy Americans and redistribution: The role of fairness preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 225(C).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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