Tales of Contract Enforcement in Transition
This paper proposes a dynamic theory of adjustment of the two contract enforcement mechanisms: use of collateral and coalitions employing multilateral punishment strategies. We show that in the aftermath of transition, both of these mechanisms fail to provide sufficient protection so that not only the new contracts are excessively simple to economize on enforcement, but also some contracts existing before the liberalization may actually break down.
|Date of creation:||05 Apr 2000|
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