IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ecm/wc2000/1524.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Randomization, Endogeneity and Laboratory Experiments

Author

Listed:
  • John C. Ham

    (Ohio State University)

  • John H. Kagel

    (Ohio State University)

  • Steven F. Lehrer

    (University of Pittsburgh)

Abstract

In conducting experiments with multiple trials, outcomes from previous trials can impact on current behavior. One of the most obvious cases in which this can happen, and the case considered in this paper, is in an auction market experiment, where earnings from previous auction trials alter cash balances which, in turn, can affect bidding behavior. (The most obvious mechanism for such a result, within standard theory, is if bidders are risk averse and do not have constant absolute risk aversion. One can imagine a number of non-standard reasons for such effects as well.) Use of OLS regressions with cash balances included as a right hand side variable are likely to lead to a biased estimate of the cash balance effect since the variation in cash balances is largely related to differences in bidding strategies across individuals. Fixed effect regressions can commonly control for these endogeniety problems at the potential cost of obtaining inefficient estimates, since this estimator does not exploit between-individual variation. This paper addresses this problem in two ways. First we consider an experimental design that reduces the potential bias of OLS estimates while increasing the precision of fixed effect estimates. Second, we consider instrumental variables estimation of the cash balance effect where the instruments are produced by the experimental design. To the best of our knowledge, neither of these approaches has been explored in the experimental literature.

Suggested Citation

  • John C. Ham & John H. Kagel & Steven F. Lehrer, 2000. "Randomization, Endogeneity and Laboratory Experiments," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1524, Econometric Society.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1524
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/1524.pdf
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brundy, James M & Jorgenson, Dale W, 1971. "Efficient Estimation of Simultaneous Equations by Instrumental Variables," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 53(3), pages 207-224, August.
    2. Buse, A, 1992. "The Bias of Instrumental Variable Estimators," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 173-180, January.
    3. Altonji, Joseph G & Segal, Lewis M, 1996. "Small-Sample Bias in GMM Estimation of Covariance Structures," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 14(3), pages 353-366, July.
    4. Friedman, Daniel, 1992. "Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1374-1378, December.
    5. Merlo, Antonio & Schotter, Andrew, 1992. "Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1413-1425, December.
    6. Hansen, Robert G & Lott, John R, Jr, 1991. "The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 347-361, March.
    7. Chamberlain, Gary, 1984. "Panel data," Handbook of Econometrics, in: Z. Griliches† & M. D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 1247-1318, Elsevier.
    8. Hausman, Jerry, 2015. "Specification tests in econometrics," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 38(2), pages 112-134.
    9. Kagel, John H. & Levin, Dan, 1986. "The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 894-920, December.
    10. Kagel, John H & Roth, Alvin E, 1992. "Theory and Misbehavior in First-Price Auctions: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1379-1391, December.
    11. John H. Kagel & Colin M. Campbell & Dan Levin, 1999. "The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 325-334, March.
    12. Douglas Staiger & James H. Stock, 1997. "Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(3), pages 557-586, May.
    13. Kagel, John H & Harstad, Ronald M & Levin, Dan, 1987. "Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1275-1304, November.
    14. James Brundy & Dale W. Jorgenson, 1971. "Efficient estimation of simultaneous equations by instrumental variables," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 3, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    15. Cox, James C & Smith, Vernon L & Walker, James M, 1992. "Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1392-1412, December.
    16. Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gary Charness, 2004. "Attribution and Reciprocity in an Experimental Labor Market," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(3), pages 665-688, July.
    2. Ronald Bosman & Arno Riedl, 2003. "Emotions and Economic Shocks in a First-Price Auction," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-056/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    3. Mario Biggeri & Domenico Colucci & Nicola Doni & Vincenzo Valori, 2021. "Good deeds, business, and social responsibility in a market experiment," Working Papers - Economics wp2021_14.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    4. Olivier Armantier, 2006. "Do Wealth Differences Affect Fairness Considerations?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(2), pages 391-429, May.
    5. John Kagel & Katherine Wolfe, 2001. "Tests of Fairness Models Based on Equity Considerations in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(3), pages 203-219, December.
    6. John C. Ham & Steven F. Lehrer, 2020. "Instrumental variables estimation of a simple dynamic model of bidding behavior in private value auctions," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(2), pages 139-155, December.
    7. Trauten, Andreas & Langer, Thomas, 2007. "Information production and bidding in IPOs: An experimental analysis of auctions and fixed-price offerings," Working Papers 50, University of Münster, Competence Center Internet Economy and Hybrid Systems, European Research Center for Information Systems (ERCIS).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2007. "Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(6), pages 1721-1770, November.
    2. Andreas Roider & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012. "Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(3), pages 808-830, September.
    3. Ham, John C. & Kagel, John H. & Lehrer, Steven F., 2005. "Randomization, endogeneity and laboratory experiments: the role of cash balances in private value auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 125(1-2), pages 175-205.
    4. Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 247-272, May.
    5. Guilhem Bascle, 2008. "Controlling for endogeneity with instrumental variables in strategic management research," Post-Print hal-00576795, HAL.
    6. Geweke, J. & Joel Horowitz & Pesaran, M.H., 2006. "Econometrics: A Bird’s Eye View," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0655, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    7. Jay R. Corrigan & Matthew C. Rousu, 2006. "The Effect of Initial Endowments in Experimental Auctions," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 88(2), pages 448-457.
    8. Roman M. Sheremeta, 2016. "Impulsive Behavior in Competition: Testing Theories of Overbidding in Rent-Seeking Contests," Working Papers 16-21, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    9. Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2005. "Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 703-741, August.
    10. Rapoport, Amnon & Chung Lo, Alison King & Zwick, Rami, 2002. "Choice of Prizes Allocated by Multiple Lotteries with Endogenously Determined Probabilities," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 180-206, January.
    11. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Andres Romeu, 2002. "Structural Inferences from First-Price Auction Experiments," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 531.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    12. Emel Filiz & Erkut Y. Ozbay, 2005. "Auctions with Anticipated Regret," Experimental 0511006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Fiore, Annamaria, 2009. "Experimental Economics: Some Methodological Notes," MPRA Paper 12498, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Tibor Neugebauer & Javier Perote, 2005. "Theory And Misbehavior Of First-Price Auctions: The Importance Of Information Feedback In Experimental Markets," Experimental 0503008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Menezes, Flavio Marques & Dutra, Joísa Campanher, 2001. "Hybrid Auctions II: Experimental Evidence," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 422, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
    16. Robert Dorsey & Laura Razzolini, 2003. "Explaining Overbidding in First Price Auctions Using Controlled Lotteries," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(2), pages 123-140, October.
    17. Mark Van Boening & Stephen Rassenti & Vernon Smith, 1998. "Numerical Computation of Equilibrium Bid Functions in a First-Price Auction with Heterogeneous Risk Attitudes," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 1(2), pages 147-159, September.
    18. Olivier Armantier & Nicolas Treich, 2006. "Overbidding in Independant Private-Values Auctions and Misperception of Probabilities," CIRANO Working Papers 2006s-15, CIRANO.
    19. Broich, Tobias, 2017. "Do authoritarian regimes receive more Chinese development finance than democratic ones? Empirical evidence for Africa," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 180-207.
    20. Matthew Roelofs, 2002. "Common Value Auctions with Default: An Experimental Approach," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 5(3), pages 233-252, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1524. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/essssea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Christopher F. Baum (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/essssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.