Toward a Theory of Reinsurance and Retrocession
There is a natural tradeoff between the benefits of increasing the number of competitors in an insurance market and the drawback to the weakening of the law of large numbers due to the diminishing of average reserves. In this investigation we consider the possibility for optimal layers of reinsurance and retrocession in the design of the insurance industry. A general question which may be asked of all financial institutions is what factors limit the number of layers of paper which can be constructed?
|Date of creation:||Jun 1999|
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|Publication status:||Published in Insurance: Mathematics and Economics (2001), 29(2): 271-290|
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