Corporate Governance as a Commitmente and Signalling Device
A model is presented, where firms issuing equity differ in the ability of their controlling shareholders to extract private benefits: this creates a lemon problem, leading to cross-subsidization across issuers. A governance institution is introduced, enabling large shareholders to (imperfectly) commit to the general interest of shareholders. The following main results are obtained. I) Controlling shareholders willing to apply such an institution are those with a level of private benefits either very low or very high: the former employ the institutional constraint as a signalling device, the latter as a commitment device. Those with an intermediate level of private benefits are not interested. II) A higher ownership concentration reduces the large shareholder’s incentive to commit. III) Self-regulation dominates regulation.
|Length:||nn pages 20|
|Date of creation:||Jun 2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.unicatt.it/Istituti/EconomiaFinanzaEmail: |
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- Paolo, Santella & Carlo, Drago & Giulia, Paone, 2007. "Who cares about Director Independence?," MPRA Paper 2288, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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