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(In)efficient Trading Forms in Competing Vertical Chains

Author

Listed:
  • Chrysovalantou Milliou
  • Emmanuel Petrakis

    () (Department of Economics, University of Crete, Greece)

  • Nikos Vettas

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Chrysovalantou Milliou & Emmanuel Petrakis & Nikos Vettas, 2009. "(In)efficient Trading Forms in Competing Vertical Chains," Working Papers 0916, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:crt:wpaper:0916
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    File URL: http://economics.soc.uoc.gr/wpa/docs/0916.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Inderst, Roman & Wey, Christian, 2007. "Buyer power and supplier incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 647-667, April.
    2. Jiyun Cao & Arijit Mukherjee, 2014. "Market Power of the Input Supplier, Technology Transfer and Consumer Welfare," CESifo Working Paper Series 5093, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Milliou, Chrysovalantou & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2005. "Upstream horizontal mergers, bargaining, vertical contracts," UC3M Working papers. Economics we051507, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    4. Normann, Hans-Theo, 2009. "Vertical integration, raising rivals' costs and upstream collusion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 461-480, May.
    5. Roman Inderst & Tommaso Valletti, 2009. "Price discrimination in input markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 1-19.
    6. Hiroshi Kitamura & Noriaki Matsushima & Misato Sato, 2013. "How Does Downstream Firms' Efficiency Affect Exclusive Supply Agreements?," ISER Discussion Paper 0878r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Sep 2015.
    7. Fabian Herweg & Daniel Müller, 2012. "Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Downstream Entry and Efficiency," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(3), pages 773-799, September.
    8. Chrysovalantou Milliou & Apostolis Pavlou, 2009. "Upstream Horizontal Mergers and Efficiency Gains," CESifo Working Paper Series 2748, CESifo Group Munich.
    9. Chrysovalantou Miliou & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2005. "Upstream Horizontal Mergers, Bargaining and Vertical Contracts," Working Papers 0509, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    10. repec:dpr:wpaper:0878 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Roman Inderst & Tommaso M. Valletti, 2011. "Buyer Power And The ‘Waterbed Effect’," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 1-20, March.
    12. Daniel Müller & Fabian Herweg, 2009. "Price Discrimination in Input Markets: Downstream Entry and Welfare," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse06_2010, University of Bonn, Germany.
    13. Barros, Pedro Pita & Brito, Duarte & de Lucena, Diogo, 2006. "Mergers in the food retailing sector: An empirical investigation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 447-468, February.
    14. Dobson, Paul W. & Waterson, Michael, 2007. "The competition effects of industry-wide vertical price fixing in bilateral oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 935-962, October.
    15. Inderst, Roman, 2007. "Leveraging buyer power," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 908-924, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Vertical chains; Strategic contracting; Bargaining; Two-part tariffs; Price-quantity bundles; Wholesale prices; Vertical integration;

    JEL classification:

    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce

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