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To trust is good, but to control is better: how investors discipline financial advisors’ activity

Author

Listed:
  • Riccardo Calcagno

    (EMYLON Business School and CeRPñCollegio Carlo Alberto)

  • Maela Giofré

    (University of Turin)

  • Maria Cesira Urzì-Brancati

    (International Longevity Centre - UK)

Abstract

Using a survey of clients from one of the largest Italian banks, we investigate whether investors exert some form of control over the quality of the recommendations they receive, and if so which one. We find that investors with low level of trust seek financial counselling, but decide autonomously. Within this subgroup of investors, those with high self-assessed financial competence are more likely to control the quality of the advice. We also observe that their test-based degree of financial literacy affects the way they discipline the advisors. Investors with high financial literacy monitor the advisor’s activity by themselves. Instead, investors with low financial literacy are more likely to search for a second expert’s opinion which confirms the recommendations previously received, as for credence services. Our findings suggest that access to different financial institutions is beneficial especially for investors with poor financial literacy.

Suggested Citation

  • Riccardo Calcagno & Maela Giofré & Maria Cesira Urzì-Brancati, 2016. "To trust is good, but to control is better: how investors discipline financial advisors’ activity," CeRP Working Papers 157, Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies, Turin (Italy).
  • Handle: RePEc:crp:wpaper:157
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    2. Antonio Díaz & Francisco Jareño & Eliseo Navarro, 2022. "Yield curve data choice and potential moral hazard: An empirical exercise on pricing callable bonds," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(2), pages 2124-2145, April.
    3. Reiter-Gavish, Liron & Qadan, Mahmoud & Yagil, Joseph, 2021. "Financial advice: Who Exactly Follows It?," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 244-258.
    4. Zongrun Wang & Mei Yang, 2020. "Effective allocation of financial services intensity and its impact on channel competition," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(8), pages 1473-1492, December.
    5. Katarina Kostelic, 2019. "Advisor Choice: Influences of Personality Traits, General Attitudes and Suggested Biases," Eurasian Journal of Business and Management, Eurasian Publications, vol. 7(1), pages 31-43.
    6. Cruciani, Caterina & Gardenal, Gloria & Rigoni, Ugo, 2021. "Trust-formation processes in financial advisors: A structural equation model," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 185-199.
    7. Lu, Xiaomeng & Zhang, Yong & Zhang, Yixing & Wang, Lin, 2020. "Can investment advisors promote rational investment? Evidence from micro-data in China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 251-263.
    8. Ziying Yang & Jie Gao & Du Yu, 2024. "Cognition ability, financial advice seeking, and investment performance: New evidence from China," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 24(1), pages 53-82, March.
    9. Baeckström, Ylva & Marsh, Ian W. & Silvester, Joanne, 2021. "Variations in investment advice provision: A study of financial advisors of millionaire investors," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 188(C), pages 716-735.
    10. Steffen Westermann & Scott J. Niblock & Jennifer L. Harrison & Michael A. Kortt, 2020. "Financial Advice Seeking: A Review of the Barriers and Benefits," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 39(4), pages 367-388, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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