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Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance in Political Selection in China

Author

Listed:
  • Kudamatsu, Masayuki
  • Jia, Ruixue
  • Seim, David

Abstract

Who becomes a top politician in China? We focus on provincial leaders, a pool of candidates for top political office, and examine how their chance of being promoted depends on performance - measured by provincial economic growth - and connections with top politicians - measured by past joint work in the same branch of government. A simple theoretical framework suggests that performance and connections may interact, an aspect ignored in the previous literature. Over the period 1993-2009, we find a positive correlation between promotion and growth that is robustly stronger for connected provincial leaders than for unconnected ones. This evidence indicates that performance and connections are complements in the Chinese political selection process. Auxiliary evidence suggests that the documented promotion pattern does not distort the allocation of talent.

Suggested Citation

  • Kudamatsu, Masayuki & Jia, Ruixue & Seim, David, 2013. "Complementary Roles of Connections and Performance in Political Selection in China," CEPR Discussion Papers 9523, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9523
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Cao, Xun & Kleit, Andrew & Liu, Chuyu, 2016. "Why invest in wind energy? Career incentives and Chinese renewable energy politics," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 120-131.
    2. Yulia Muratova & Jakob Arnoldi & Xin Chen & Joachim Scholderer, 2018. "Political rotations and cross-province firm acquisitions in China," Asian Business & Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 17(1), pages 37-58, February.
    3. Chen, Ting & Kung, J.K.-S., 2016. "Do land revenue windfalls create a political resource curse? Evidence from China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 86-106.
    4. Danli Wang & Terence Tai-Leung Chong, 2017. "Political Turnover and the Stock Performance of SOEs in China," Chinese Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(1), pages 21-33, January.
    5. Qiu, Leiju & Li, Tianyu & He, Qing & Zhao, Daxuan, 2021. "Policy uncertainty and overseas property purchases: Evidence from China," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    6. Barbara Krug & Alexander Libman, 2015. "Commitment to local autonomy in non-democracies: Russia and China compared," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 221-245, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Chinese provincial leaders; Political selection in autocracy; Promotion; Social Networks;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O53 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Asia including Middle East
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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