Preferences for Rigid Versus Individualized Wage Setting
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- Björn Brügemann, 2012.
"Does Employment Protection Create Its Own Political Support?,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
European Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 369-416, April.
- Brugemann, Bjorn, 2006. "Does Employment Protection Create Its Own Political Support?," Working Papers 20, Yale University, Department of Economics.
- Brügemann, Björn, 2006. "Does Employment Protection Create Its Own Political Support?," IZA Discussion Papers 2286, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Piccirilli, Giulio, 2015. "On the impact of firing costs under different wage setting regimes," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 86-99.
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Keywordsequilibrium unemployment; firing taxes; job protection; renegotiation costs; wage rigidities;
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
- J60 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - General
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