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Electoral College, Popular Vote and Regional Information

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  • Grüner, Hans Peter
  • Behm, Martina

Abstract

We take up the discussion started by Condorcet on which voting system yields the highest probability that a good decision is taken. When regional information shocks are taken into account, an Electoral College system has advantages over simple majority vote under certain conditions: The probability that the utility-maximizing candidate wins is higher in the Electoral College system if the size of the adverse regional information shock is large.

Suggested Citation

  • Grüner, Hans Peter & Behm, Martina, 2002. "Electoral College, Popular Vote and Regional Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 3371, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3371
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard Cebula, 2001. "The electoral college and voter participation: Evidence on two hypotheses," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 29(3), pages 304-310, September.
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    3. Nicola Persico & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 225-239, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electoral college; Popular vote; Regional information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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