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Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparency

Author

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  • Perotti, Enrico C
  • von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig

Abstract

This paper studies product market competition under a strategic transparency decision. Dominant investors can influence information collection in the financial market, and thereby corporate transparency, by affecting market liquidity or the cost of information collection. More transparency on a firm's competitive position has both strategic advantages and disadvantages: in general, transparency results in higher variability of profits and output. Thus lenders prefer less information revelation through stock market trading, since this protects firms when in a weak competitive position, while equityholders prefer to make full use of the strategic advantage of a strong firm. We show that bank-controlled firms will tend to discourage trading to reduce price informativeness, while shareholder-run firms prefer more transparency. Our comparative statics show that bank control may fail to keep firms less transparent as global trading volumes rise.

Suggested Citation

  • Perotti, Enrico C & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 1998. "Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparency," CEPR Discussion Papers 1948, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1948
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    Cited by:

    1. Demirgüç-Kunt, AslI & Detragiache, Enrica & Tressel, Thierry, 2008. "Banking on the principles: Compliance with Basel Core Principles and bank soundness," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 511-542, October.
    2. Jeremiah Harris & William O'Brien, 2022. "Do U.S. firms disguise acquisitions to avoid taxes?," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 95-127, February.
    3. Forssbaeck, Jens & Oxel, Lars, 2014. "The Multi-Faceted Concept of Transparency," Working Paper Series 1013, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    4. Van Tassel, Eric, 2011. "Information disclosure in credit markets when banks' costs are endogenous," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 490-497, February.
    5. repec:mbr:jmonec:v:6:y:2012:i:2:p:191-209 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Hilary, Gilles, 2003. "Accounting behavior of German firms after an ADR issuance," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 355-376.
    7. de La Bruslerie, Hubert & Gabteni, Heger, 2014. "Voluntary disclosure of financial information by French firms: Does the introduction of IFRS matter?," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 367-380.
    8. Gagalyuk, Taras & Chatalova, Lioudmila & Kalyuzhnyy Oleksandr, . "Broadening the scope of instrumental motivations for CSR disclosure: an illustration for agroholdings in transition economies," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 24(4).
    9. Gagalyuk, Taras & Chatalova, Lioudmila & Kalyuzhnyy, Oleksandr & Ostapchuk, Igor, 2021. "Broadening the scope of instrumental motivations for CSR disclosure: An illustration for agroholdings in transition economies," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 24(4), pages 717-737.
    10. Overfelt, Wouter Van & Annaert, Jan & Ceuster, Marc De & Deloof, Marc, 2009. "Do universal banks create value? Universal bank affiliation and company performance in Belgium, 1905-1909," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 253-265, April.
    11. Enrico C. Perotti & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 2001. "Outside Finance, Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparancy," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 01-019/2, Tinbergen Institute.
    12. Anthony M. Gould & Jean‐Etienne Joullié & Kate Gould, 2024. "First things first: Unselfconscious corporate virtuosity and corporate performance," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 692-706, February.
    13. Marquez, Robert, 2010. "Informed lending as a deterrent to predation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 193-201, December.
    14. Mohamed, Abdulkadir & Schwienbacher, Armin, 2016. "Voluntary disclosure of corporate venture capital investments," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 69-83.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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