Vertical Governance between Airlines and Airports – A Transaction Cost Analysis
With airport privatization and infrastructure expansion projects taking place in the liberalized European air transport market, airport and airline companies are critically reevaluating their vertical governance structures. This paper analyzes the comparative efficiency of vertical governance structures in the airport-airline supply relationship. Using transaction cost economics as the lens of analysis, we develop propositions and present supporting qualitative case studies. Our propositions state that hub airlines and hub airports seek specialized governance structures, while value-based carriers and base airports enter into long-term contracts supported by complementary safeguards. These privately crafted governance modes complement or even replace external regulation.
|Date of creation:||2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Review of Network Economics, 2006, Vol 5, Issue 4, p. 386-412|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: ++49 / (0)30 / 314 - 25 048|
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