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A Study of Zero-Out Auctions: Testbed Experiments of a Process of Allocating Private Rights to the Use of Public Property

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  • Guler, Kmal
  • Plott, Charles R.
  • Vuong, Quang H.

Abstract

This paper applies an experimental testbed methodology to the evaluation of a proposed mechanism for allocating the right to land at the New York airports. The mechanism is called a "zero-out auction" because it is supposed to allocate the rights efficiently like an auction while leaving all of the consumer's surplus with the buyers (as opposed to allocating some to the seller as would be the case with an ordinary auction). A new behavioral hypothesis is introduced to account for limited rationality of individuals and unusual behaviors of the process. The axiom, called the unbiased expectations hypothesis, does a good job of modeling individual behavior in the context of a game model.
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Suggested Citation

  • Guler, Kmal & Plott, Charles R. & Vuong, Quang H., "undated". "A Study of Zero-Out Auctions: Testbed Experiments of a Process of Allocating Private Rights to the Use of Public Property," Working Papers 650, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:650
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    File URL: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/sswp650c.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Khezr, Peyman & MacKenzie, Ian A., 2018. "Consignment auctions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 42-51.
    2. Chen, Kay-Yut & Plott, Charles R., 1998. "Nonlinear Behavior in Sealed Bid First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 34-78, October.
    3. Liu, Yun & Tan, Bowen, 2021. "Consignment auctions revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    4. Ortmann, Andreas, 2003. "Charles R. Plott's collected papers on the experimental foundations of economic and political science," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 555-575, August.
    5. Li, Zhi & Zhang, Da & Zhang, Xiliang, 2022. "Emissions Trading with Consignment Auctions: A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment," EfD Discussion Paper 22-10, Environment for Development, University of Gothenburg.
    6. Wang, Baixue & Duan, Maosheng, 2022. "Consignment auctions of emissions trading systems: An agent-based approach based on China’s practice," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).

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