Is Bigger Better? Investing in Reputation
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References listed on IDEAS
- Diamond, Douglas W, 1989. "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 828-862, August.
- George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2001.
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- Marco Trombetta & Mónica Espinosa, 2004. "The Reputational Consequences Of Disclosures," Working Papers. Serie EC 2004-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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04-52, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Hakenes, Hendrik & Peitz, Martin, 2004. "Selling Reputation When Going out of Business," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 04-52, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Hendrik Hakenes & Martin Peitz, 2004. "Selling Reputation When Going out of Business," CESifo Working Paper Series 1213, CESifo Group Munich.
- Hongbin Cai & Ichiro Obara, 2009.
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- Cai, Hongbin, 2004. "Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt6rk9f1fm, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
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"Observable Reputation Trading,"
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Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(2), pages 693-730, May.
- Hakenes, Hendrik & Peitz, Martin, 2006. "Observable Reputation Trading," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 131, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 318, UCLA Department of Economics.
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