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Tax policies to promote private charitable giving in DAC countries

Author

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  • David Roodman
  • Scott Standley

Abstract

Researchers have written hundreds of papers on the causes and consequences of official foreign aid, while paying almost no attention to private overseas giving, by individuals, universities, foundations, and corporations. Yet private giving is significant—some $15.5 billion/year, compared to more than $60 billion/year in public giving—and is in no small part an outcome of public policy. In most rich countries, tax deductions and credits lower the “price” of charity to donors. And governments with low tax revenue/GDP ratios leave more money in private pockets for private charity. To correct the near-complete lack of information on this de facto aid policy, we survey officials of 21 donor nations on the use of tax incentives to promote private charity. From the results, we develop an index of the overall incentive for private charity, expressed as a percentage increase over the hypothetical giving level absent incentives. France’s tax code creates the largest price incentive while those of Austria, Finland, and Sweden offer none. Factoring in the income effect of the tax ratio, Australia, Ireland, Germany, and the United States move to the top, with combined price and income effects sufficient to double private giving. As a result, tax policy appears to have nearly doubled private overseas giving from donor countries in 2003, from a counterfactual $8.0 billion. Two-thirds of the $7.5 billion increase occurred in the United States. Of that, nearly 40% appears to be U.S. charity to Israel. According to 21-country scatter plots, countries with lower church attendance and more faith in the national legislature have lower taxes (stronger income effect), but average levels of targeted tax incentives. Income (GDP/capita) does correlate with private overseas aid/capita, but also with public aid/capita, so that the two aid flows are complementary in magnitude.

Suggested Citation

  • David Roodman & Scott Standley, 2006. "Tax policies to promote private charitable giving in DAC countries," Working Papers 82, Center for Global Development.
  • Handle: RePEc:cgd:wpaper:82
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    File URL: http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/6303
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. One Nation, Incentivized and Disincentivized
      by Justin Fox in HBR Blog Network on 2013-07-04 18:30:09

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Axel Dreher & Florian Moelders & Peter Nunnenkamp, 2007. "Are NGOs the Better Donors? A Case Study of Aid Allocation for Sweden," KOF Working papers 07-180, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
    2. Herzer, Dierk & Nunnenkamp, Peter, 2013. "Private Donations, Government Grants, Commercial Activities, and Fundraising: Cointegration and Causality for NGOs in International Development Cooperation," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 234-251.
    3. Paxton, Pamela & Knack, Stephen, 2008. "Individual and country-level factors affecting support for foreign aid," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4714, The World Bank.
    4. Gabrielle Fack & Camille Landais, 2010. "Are Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving Efficient? Evidence from France," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 117-141, May.
    5. Axel Dreher & Florian Mölders & Peter Nunnenkamp, 2010. "Aid Delivery through Non‐governmental Organisations: Does the Aid Channel Matter for the Targeting of Swedish Aid?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 147-176, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Foreign aid; charitable giving; tax incentives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies

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