State Capture: From Yeltsin to Putin
In this short paper we attempt to assess the results of Putin’s centralization and anti-corruption measures on the overall level of state capture in the Russian regions as well as on the balance of power between different interest groups. We proceed by, first, describing the results of previous research on state capture in the Russia’s regions during Yeltsin in section 1 and, then, analyzing the changes in the nature and the level of state capture during Putin’s administration in section 2. Section 3 concludes.
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|Date of creation:||Oct 2005|
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