IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_3214.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Interjurisdictional Spillovers, Decentralized Policymaking and the Elasticity of Capital Supply

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas Eichner
  • Marco Runkel

Abstract

This paper points to the important role which the elasticity of aggregate capital supply with respect to the net rate of return to capital plays for the efficiency of policymaking in a decentralized economy with mobile capital and spillovers among jurisdictions. In accordance with previous studies, we show that under the assumption of a fixed capital supply (zero capital supply elasticity) the decentralized policy choice is optimal. If the capital supply elasticity is strictly positive, however, capital tax rates are inefficiently low in the decentralized equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Eichner & Marco Runkel, 2010. "Interjurisdictional Spillovers, Decentralized Policymaking and the Elasticity of Capital Supply," CESifo Working Paper Series 3214, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3214
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3214.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gylfason, Thorvaldur, 1993. " Optimal Saving, Interest Rates, and Endogenous Growth," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 95(4), pages 517-533, December.
    2. Bucovetsky, S., 1991. "Asymmetric tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 167-181, September.
    3. Hikaru Ogawa & David E. Wildasin, 2009. "Think Locally, Act Locally: Spillovers, Spillbacks, and Efficient Decentralized Policymaking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1206-1217, September.
    4. Beck, John H., 1983. "Tax competition, uniform assessment, and the benefit principle," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 127-146, March.
    5. Wilson, John Douglas & Wildasin, David E., 2004. "Capital tax competition: bane or boon," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(6), pages 1065-1091, June.
    6. Oates, Wallace E. & Schwab, Robert M., 1988. "Economic competition among jurisdictions: efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 333-354, April.
    7. Michael J. Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2002. "Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High Taxes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 363-370, March.
    8. Boskin, Michael J, 1978. "Taxation, Saving, and the Rate of Interest," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(2), pages 3-27, April.
    9. Michael J. Boskin, 1978. "Taxation, Saving, and the Rate of Interest," NBER Chapters,in: Research in Taxation, pages 3-27 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fell, Harrison & Kaffine, Daniel T., 2014. "Can decentralized planning really achieve first-best in the presence of environmental spillovers?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 46-53.
    2. Eichner, Thomas & Runkel, Marco, 2014. "Subsidizing renewable energy under capital mobility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 50-59.
    3. repec:aue:wpaper:1509 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Jan Siegmeier & Linus Mattauch & Max Franks & David Klenert & Anselm Schultes & Ottmar Edenhofer, 2015. "A Public Finance Perspective on Climate Policy: Six Interactions That May Enhance Welfare," Working Papers 2015.31, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    5. Harrison Fell & Daniel T. Kaffine, 2013. "Think locally, act locally: Can decentralized planning really achieve first-best in the presence of environmental spillovers?," Working Papers 2013-07, Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business.
    6. Soldatos, Gerasimos T., 2014. "Local Taxation, Private-Public Consumption Complementarity, and the Optimal Number of Jurisdictions," MPRA Paper 60861, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Eichner, Thomas & Pethig, Rüdiger, 2014. "Self-enforcing environmental agreements and capital mobility," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 120-132.
    8. Nikos Tsakiris & Panos Hatzipanayotou & Michael S. Michael, 2015. "Emission Permits and Public Pollution Abatement:: Can Decentralized Environmental Policies be Efficient?," CESifo Working Paper Series 5278, CESifo Group Munich.
    9. Nikos Tsakiris & Panos Hatzipanayotou & Michael S. Michael, 2015. "Welfare Ranking of Environmental Policies in the Presence of Capital Mobility and Cross-border Pollution," DEOS Working Papers 1513, Athens University of Economics and Business.
    10. Junichi Haraguchi & Hikaru Ogawa, 2016. "Leadership in Tax Ccompetition with Fiscal Equalization Transfers ," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1031, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    11. Satoshi Kasamatsu & Hikaru Ogawa, 2017. "International Capital Market and Repeated Tax Competition," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1071, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    12. Anton Bondarev & Beat Hintermann & Frank C. Krysiak & Ralph Winkler, 2017. "The Intricacy of Adapting to Climate Change: Flood Protection as a Local Public Goods Game," CESifo Working Paper Series 6382, CESifo Group Munich.
    13. Alexeev, Alexander & Good, David H. & Krutilla, Kerry, 2016. "Environmental taxation and the double dividend in decentralized jurisdictions," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 90-100.
    14. Gregor Schwerhoff & Ottmar Edenhofer, 2013. "Is Capital Mobility Good for Public Good Provision?," CESifo Working Paper Series 4420, CESifo Group Munich.
    15. repec:eee:regeco:v:68:y:2018:i:c:p:191-203 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Gregor Schwerhoff & Ottmar Edenhofer, 2014. "The Globalization Paradox Revisited," CESifo Working Paper Series 4878, CESifo Group Munich.
    17. Pi, Jiancai & Zhou, Yu, 2014. "Tax competition in federations revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 104-107.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    decentralized policymaking; spillovers; capital supply elasticity;

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3214. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Klaus Wohlrabe). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.