IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cem/doctra/714.html

Políticas Regulatorias Aplicadas a Sectores de Infraestructura en Argentina

Author

Listed:
  • Gustavo Ferro
  • Andrea Castellano
  • Chaz Sardi

Abstract

Resumen: Estudiamos la evolución reciente de la prestación y regulación de servicios de infraestructura en Argentina. Nos concentramos tras un análisis global del proceso, en cuatro servicios domiciliarios: electricidad, gas natural de red, telecomunicaciones y agua y saneamiento. Mostramos los cambios de enfoque y el fracaso de sucesivas políticas de signos contrarios. Evidenciamos que la situación macroeconómica no ha sido ajena a la imposibilidad de tener servicios públicos autofinanciados, eficientes y accesibles, en particular el uso de controles sobre las tarifas como herramienta antiinflacionaria. Abstract: We study the recent evolution of the utilities services and regulation in Argentina. We focus, after a global approach to the issue in four domiciliary services: electricity, natural gas by piped network, telecommunications and water and sanitation. We show the changing policy approach and the failure to successive contradictory policies. We highlight the connection between these failures in having self-financing, efficient and affordable services, and macroeconomic problems, particularly, the use of tariff control as an anti-inflationary tool.

Suggested Citation

  • Gustavo Ferro & Andrea Castellano & Chaz Sardi, 2020. "Políticas Regulatorias Aplicadas a Sectores de Infraestructura en Argentina," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 714, Universidad del CEMA.
    • Handle: RePEc:cem:doctra:714
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ucema.edu.ar/publicaciones/download/documentos/714.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gustavo Ferro, 2004. "Sector de Agua y Saneamiento, Tarifa Social en Argentina," UADE Textos de Discusión 49_2003, Instituto de Economía, Universidad Argentina de la Empresa.
    2. Gustavo Ferro & Omar O. Chisari, 2010. "Tópicos de Economía de la Regulación de los Servicios Públicos," Working Papers hal-00473038, HAL.
    3. Berg, Sanford V., 2013. "Best practices in regulating State-owned and municipal water utilities," Documentos de Proyectos 4079, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    4. Gustavo Ferro & Diego Petrecolla, 2003. "Subsidios cruzados en Agua y Cloacas: la concesión de Buenos Aires," UADE Textos de Discusión 48_2003, Instituto de Economía, Universidad Argentina de la Empresa.
    5. Omar Chisari & Antonio Estache, 1999. "The Needs of the Poor in Infraestructure Privatization. The Role of Universal Service Obligations. The Case of Argentina," UADE Textos de Discusión 3_1999, Instituto de Economía, Universidad Argentina de la Empresa.
    6. W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Harrington & John M. Vernon, 2005. "Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, 4th Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 4, volume 1, number 026222075x, December.
    7. Gustavo Ferro, 2000. "El Servicio de Agua y Saneamiento en Buenos Aires: Privatización y Regulación," UADE Textos de Discusión 16_2000, Instituto de Economía, Universidad Argentina de la Empresa.
    8. Patricio Rozas Balbontín & José Luis Bonifaz, 2014. "Notas sobre la Teoría de la empresa pública de servicios de infraestructura y su regulación," Working Papers 14-02, Centro de Investigación, Universidad del Pacífico, revised Mar 2014.
    9. Diego Petrecolla & Gustavo Ferro, 2003. "Crisis y Respuestas: Tarifa Social en Agua y Saneamiento en Argentina," UADE Textos de Discusión 47_2003, Instituto de Economía, Universidad Argentina de la Empresa.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Marques, Rui Cunha, 2017. "Why not regulate PPPs?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 141-146.
    2. Gustavo Ferro & Omar O. Chisari, 2010. "Tópicos de Economía de la Regulación de los Servicios Públicos," Working Papers hal-00473038, HAL.
    3. Matteo Migheli & Giovanni Battista Ramello, 2018. "The market of academic attention," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 114(1), pages 113-133, January.
    4. Gisella ARAGÓN & José Luis BONIFAZ, 2013. "The water and sanitation service provision in Peru," CIRIEC Working Papers 1306, CIRIEC - Université de Liège.
    5. Michelle C. Pautz, 2009. "Perceptions of the Regulated Community in Environmental Policy: The View from Below," Review of Policy Research, Policy Studies Organization, vol. 26(5), pages 533-550, September.
    6. Frank H. Stephen, 2013. "Lawyers, Markets and Regulation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14803.
    7. Mohammad Akbarpour & Piotr Dworczak & Scott Duke Kominers, 2024. "Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 132(6), pages 1831-1875.
    8. Christian von Hirschhausen, 2022. "Nuclear Power in the Twenty-first Century (Part II) - The Economic Value of Plutonium," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 2011, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    9. Adriana Gama, 2020. "Standards and social welfare in Cournot oligopolies," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 22(3), pages 467-483, July.
    10. Michael Polemis & Konstantinos Eleftheriou, 2018. "To Regulate Or To Deregulate? The Role Of Downstream Competition In Upstream Monopoly Vertically Linked Markets," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(1), pages 51-63, January.
    11. Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima, 2009. "Access Charge, Vertical Separation, and Lobbying," Discussion Papers 2009-11, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration.
    12. Krancke, Jan & Vidal, Miguel & Fier, Andreas, 2012. "Changing the rules: Applying a more economic approach to dynamic telecom markets," 23rd European Regional ITS Conference, Vienna 2012 66976, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    13. Fuat Oğuz, 2020. "Hayekian complexity and the role of regulation in electricity markets," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(3), pages 406-418, October.
    14. Jarrad Harford & Robert Schonlau & Jared Stanfield, 2019. "Trade Relationships, Indirect Economic Links, and Mergers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(7), pages 3085-3110, July.
    15. Lisa Chever & Michael Klien, 2018. "Trading service quality for safety: a cautionary tale from the French ‘Robien law’ on elevator safety," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 20-36, February.
    16. Bergquist, Ann-Kristin & Söderholm, Kristina & Kinneryd, Hanna & Lindmark, Magnus & Söderholm, Patrick, 2012. "Command-and-Control Revisited: Environmental Compliance and Innovation in Swedish Industry 1970-1990," CERE Working Papers 2012:2, CERE - the Center for Environmental and Resource Economics.
    17. Lindemann, Henrik, 2015. "Budgetary Interests and the Degree of Unbundling in Electricity Markets - An Empirical Analysis for OECD Countries," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-543, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    18. Camos Daurella,Daniel & Estache,Antonio, 2017. "Regulating water and sanitation network services accounting for institutional and informational constraints," Policy Research Working Paper Series 8149, The World Bank.
    19. Junichi Haraguchi & Toshihiro Matsumura, 2020. "Optimal privatization policy with asymmetry among private firms," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(3), pages 213-224, July.
    20. Olivia Jensen & Namrata Chindarkar, 2019. "Sustaining Reforms in Water Service Delivery: the Role of Service Quality, Salience, Trust and Financial Viability," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 33(3), pages 975-992, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cem:doctra:714. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Lucila Solla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cemaaar.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.