A Structural Estimation to Evaluate the Wage Penalty after Unemployment in Europe
We develop a partial equilibrium job search model to analyse wage mobility and its relation to job mobility. The basic job search model is generalized by introducing wage renegotiation at the firm level, on-the-job search and heterogeneity of individuals through the value of time while unemployed. Transitions into and out of unemployment, movement from one job to another without passing through unemployment, and wage growth on the job are all outcomes of this model. We estimate the model structurally in order to identify the sources of wage mobility in four European countries: Spain, Germany, France and Portugal. We find that German and Spanish workers tend to suffer larger wage penalties after unemployment than their French and Portuguese counterparts. Wage losses in Germany are larger and mainly related to better wage opportunities when employed, while in Spain wage losses are lower but tend to remain longer since wage growth while employed is lower than in Germany. We also use the model's structural parameters to evaluate the effect that different changes in the Unemployment Benefit system may have on wage changes after unemployment. We determine that a sole level for unemployment benefits (dependent on the national average wage level) reduces wage penalties for all workers with the exception of the highly educated.
|Date of creation:||2005|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: c/ Bailén 50. 41001 Sevilla|
Phone: (34) 955 055 210
Fax: (34) 955 055 211
Web page: http://www.centrodeestudiosandaluces.es
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Pierre Cahuc & Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, 2006.
"Wage Bargaining with On-the-Job Search: Theory and Evidence,"
Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 323-364, 03.
- Pierre Cahuc & Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, 2006. "Wage Bargaining with On-the-Job Search: Theory and Evidence," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00176090, HAL.
- Pierre Cahuc & Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, 2006. "Wage bargaining with on-the-job search: theory and evidence," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/dc0ckec3fcb, Sciences Po.
- Cahuc, Pierre & Postel-Vinay, Fabien & Robin, Jean-Marc, 2003. "Wage Bargaining with On-The-Job Search: Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 4154, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pierre Cahuc & Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, 2003. "Wage bargaining with on-the-job search : theory and evidence," Research Unit Working Papers 0212, Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquee, INRA.
- Pierre Cahuc & Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, 2006. "Wage bargaining with on-the-job search: Theory and evidence," Post-Print halshs-00754171, HAL.
- Jackman, R & Layard, Richard & Pissarides, C, 1989. "On Vacancies," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 51(4), pages 377-394, November.
- Silvio Rendón, 2001.
"Job Creation under Liquidity Constraints: the Spanish Case,"
0101, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
- Silvio Rendón, 2000. "Job creation under liquidity constraints: The Spanish case," Economics Working Papers 488, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Katharine G. Abraham & Henry S. Farber, 1986.
"Job Duration, Seniority and Earnings,"
407, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- James J. Heckman & Christopher J. Flinn, 1982.
"New Methods for Analyzing Structural Models of Labor Force Dynamics,"
NBER Working Papers
0856, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Flinn, C. & Heckman, J., 1982. "New methods for analyzing structural models of labor force dynamics," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 115-168, January.
- Harry J. Holzer, 1987. "Job Search by Employed and Unemployed Youth," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 40(4), pages 601-611, July.
- J. Ignacio García-Pérez, 2006. "Job separation in a non-stationary search model: a structural estimation to evaluate alternative unemployment insurance systems," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(2), pages 245-272.
- Namkee Ahn & J. Ignacio García Pérez, 2000.
"Unemployment duration and workers' wage aspirations in Spain,"
Economics Working Papers
426, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Namkee Ahn & José Ignacio García-Pérez, 2002. "Unemployment duration and workers' wage aspirations in Spain," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 103-118.
- Namkee Ahn & J. Ignacio GarcÌa-PÈrez, "undated". "Unemployment duration and worker's wage aspiration in Spain," Studies on the Spanish Economy 58, FEDEA.
- Dale Mortensen, 1984.
"Job Search and Labor Market Analysis,"
594, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Dolado, J.J. & Jimeno, J.F., 1995.
"Why Is Spanish Unemployment so High?,"
9515, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
- Pissarides, C. & Wadsworth, J., 1988. "On-The-Job Search: Some Empirical Evidence," Papers 317, London School of Economics - Centre for Labour Economics.
- Alfonso Rosolia & Gilles Saint Paul, 1998. "The effect of unemployment spells on subsequent wages in Spain," Economics Working Papers 295, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Bruce D. Meyer, 1988.
"Unemployment Insurance And Unemployment Spells,"
NBER Working Papers
2546, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cea:doctra:e2005_15. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Susana Mérida)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.