Optimal Tax Policy and Wage Subsidy in an Imperfectly Competitive Economy
In an imperfectly competitive economy with direct and indirect taxes, the first best wage subsidy overcompensates workers and provides the incentive to misreport working hours. We show that in the second best optimum where the government cannot use a wage subsidy, the optimal policy is to tax labour income at a zero rate. This policy is optimal because it minimizes the incentive to misreport working hours.
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- Guo, Jang-Ting & Lansing, Kevin J., 1999.
"Optimal taxation of capital income with imperfectly competitive product markets,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
Elsevier, vol. 23(7), pages 967-995, June.
- Jang-Ting Guo & Kevin J. Lansing, 1998. "Optimal taxation of capital income with imperfectly competitive product markets," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 98-04, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
- ColemanII, Wilbur John, 2000. "Welfare and optimum dynamic taxation of consumption and income," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 1-39, April.
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