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On Perverse and Second-Order Punishment in Public Goods Experiments with Decentralized Sanctioning

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  • Matthias Cinyabuguma & Talbot Page & Louis Putterman, 2004. "On Perverse and Second-Order Punishment in Public Goods Experiments with Decentralized Sanctioning," Working Papers 2004-12, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2004-12
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    Cited by:

    1. Simon Gaechter & Benedikt Herrmann, 2006. "The limits of self-governance in the presence of spite: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia," Discussion Papers 2006-13, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    2. Astrid Hopfensitz & Ernesto Reuben, 2009. "The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(540), pages 1534-1559, October.
    3. Page, Talbot & Putterman, Louis & Garcia, Bruno, 2013. "Voluntary contributions with redistribution: The effect of costly sanctions when one person's punishment is another's reward," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 34-48.
    4. Bochet, Olivier & Putterman, Louis, 2009. "Not just babble: Opening the black box of communication in a voluntary contribution experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 309-326, April.
    5. Nicolas Baumard, 2011. "Punishment is not a group adaptation," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 10(1), pages 1-26, June.
    6. David Cooper, 2007. "An introduction to the symposium on behavioral game theory," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(1), pages 1-10, October.
    7. Talbot Page & Louis Putterman & Bruno Garcia, 2008. "Getting Punnishment Right: Do Costly Monitoring or Redustributive Punishment Help?," Working Papers 2008-1, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    8. Visser, Martine & Burns, Justine, 2006. "Bridging the Great Divide in South Africa: Inequality and Punishment in the Provision of Public Goods," Working Papers in Economics 219, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    9. Anderson, Christopher M. & Putterman, Louis, 2006. "Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 1-24, January.
    10. Ding Chen & Simon Deakin & Mathias Siems & Boya Wang, 2016. "Law, Trust & Institutional Change in China: Evidence from Qualitative Fieldwork," Working Papers wp485, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    11. Casari, Marco & Luini, Luigi, 2006. "Peer Punishment in Teams: Emotional or Strategic Choice?," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1188, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    12. Visser, Martine, 2006. "Welfare Implications of Peer Punishment in Unequal Societies," Working Papers in Economics 218, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    13. Nicolas Baumard, 2010. "Has punishment played a role in the evolution of cooperation? A critical review," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 9(2), pages 171-192, December.
    14. Ertan, Arhan & Page, Talbot & Putterman, Louis, 2009. "Who to punish? Individual decisions and majority rule in mitigating the free rider problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(5), pages 495-511, July.

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