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Convex Choice

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  • Narvin Kartik
  • Andreas Kleiner

Abstract

For multidimensional Euclidean type spaces, we study convex choice: from any choice set, the set of types that make the same choice is convex. We establish that, in a suitable sense, this property characterizes the sufficiency of local incentive constraints. Convex choice is also of interest more broadly, e.g., in cheaptalk games. We tie convex choice to a notion of directional single-crossing differences (DSCD). For an expected-utility agent choosing among lotteries, DSCD implies that preferences are either one-dimensional or must take the affine form that has been tractable in multidimensional mechanism design.

Suggested Citation

  • Narvin Kartik & Andreas Kleiner, 2025. "Convex Choice," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2025_676, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2025_676
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    File URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp676
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Manelli, Alejandro M. & Vincent, Daniel R., 2012. "Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly. A corrigendum," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2492-2493.
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    3. Soheil Ghili, 2023. "A Characterization for Optimal Bundling of Products with Nonadditive Values," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 311-326, September.
    4. Manelli, Alejandro M. & Vincent, Daniel R., 2007. "Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 153-185, November.
    5. Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1987. "A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 191-200, April.
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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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