A Top Dog Tale with Preference Rigidities
With preference rigidities we find Pareto optima of an exchange economy, some of which involve unconsumed endowments. We show that such Pareto Optima can only be attained as market equilibria if there is a top dog in the initial endowment distribution who is richer than the other individuals. The most inegalitarian efficient allocation favouring the top dog is globally stable and is in the core. For endowment distributions with a top dog, the core contains efficient allocations more equal than the market equilibrium. A voting mechanism or government policy can also offset the top dog’s power.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +39 051 209 8019 and 2600
Fax: +39 051 209 8040 and 2664
Web page: http://www.dse.unibo.it
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, March.
- Sean Crockett & Ryan Oprea & Charles Plott, 2011. "Extreme Walrasian Dynamics: The Gale Example in the Lab," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 3196-3220, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp839. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Luca Miselli)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.