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Antitrust and Pricing in the Motion Picture Industry

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  • Barak Orbach

    (The University of Michigan Law School)

Abstract

Few industries have experienced the same degree of antitrust scrutiny and litigation as the motion picture industry. Nevertheless, the pricing structure of movie tickets has never been a product of free market forces. Since the early 1970s, ticket pricing has been particularly puzzling: At any given theater, admission fees are uniform across movies and over time. This Article studies the history of the industry's pricing systems in their legal, economic, and technological contexts. It shows that, despite intensive antitrust scrutiny and litigation, forces with considerable market power have always shaped the industry's pricing systems. The Article studies the present pricing regime and explores the economic justifications for uniform pricing, concluding that none of the justifications is sound. The Article argues that vertical restraints, which are illegal under present antitrust laws, have at least some impact on the persistence of the present pricing regime. It further argues that the current prohibition against distributors' intervention in ticket pricing is undesirable and that, given the idiosyncratic characteristics of the industry, a coordinated transition to a variable pricing could be desirable.

Suggested Citation

  • Barak Orbach, "undated". "Antitrust and Pricing in the Motion Picture Industry," University of Michigan John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics Working Paper Series umichlwps-1009, University of Michigan John M. Olin Center for Law & Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bep:uomlwp:umichlwps-1009
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    File URL: http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=umichlwps
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    Cited by:

    1. Terrence August & Duy Dao & Hyoduk Shin, 2015. "Optimal Timing of Sequential Distribution: The Impact of Congestion Externalities and Day-and-Date Strategies," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 34(5), pages 755-774, September.
    2. Joan Calzada & Tommaso M. Valletti, 2012. "Intertemporal Movie Distribution: Versioning When Customers Can Buy Both Versions," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(4), pages 649-667, July.
    3. Alan Collins & Antonello E. Scorcu & Roberto Zanola, 2009. "Distribution conventionality in the movie sector: an econometric analysis of cinema supply," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(8), pages 517-527.
    4. Richardson, Martin & Stähler, Frank, 2016. "On the “uniform pricing puzzle” in recorded music," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 58-66.
    5. Orbach, Barak Y. & Einav, Liran, 2007. "Uniform prices for differentiated goods: The case of the movie-theater industry," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 129-153.
    6. Drevs, Florian, 2013. "The Challenge of the Unknown – The Effect of Pay-What-You-Want on the Market Success of Publicly Subsidized Films," ZögU - Zeitschrift für öffentliche und gemeinwirtschaftliche Unternehmen, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 36(4), pages 255-270.
    7. Chien-Ping Chen, 2009. "A Puzzle or a Choice: Uniform Pricing for Motion Pictures at the Box," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 37(1), pages 73-85, March.
    8. Jehoshua Eliashberg & Anita Elberse & Mark A.A.M. Leenders, 2006. "The Motion Picture Industry: Critical Issues in Practice, Current Research, and New Research Directions," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(6), pages 638-661, 11-12.
    9. Samuel Cameron, 2011. "Cinema," Chapters, in: Ruth Towse (ed.), A Handbook of Cultural Economics, Second Edition, chapter 12, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Ricard Gil, 2015. "Does Vertical Integration Decrease Prices? Evidence from the Paramount Antitrust Case of 1948," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 162-191, May.

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