Iudex Calculat: The ECJ's Quest for Power
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More about this item
KeywordsEuropean Court of Justice; Economic Analysis of Court Behavior; Implicit and Explicit Constitutional Change; Preliminary Reference Procedure; Positive Constitutional Economics;
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
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