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Warum betreibt der Europäische Gerichtshof Rechtsfortbildung? Die Politisierungshypothese

  • Höpner, Martin
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    In der rechtswissenschaftlichen, politologischen und soziologischen Fachliteratur ist unumstritten, dass der Europäische Gerichtshof (EuGH) das europäische Recht als 'Motor der Integration' expansiv interpretiert und damit faktisch Integrationspolitik betreibt. Das Papier diskutiert anhand von zehn Richtungsentscheidungen des EuGH, ob die Politisierungshypothese einen Beitrag zur Erklärung dieses Umstands leisten kann. Die Hypothese besagt, dass EuGH-Richter ihre Entscheidungen auf Grundlage von länderspezifischen oder parteipolitischen Interessen fällen. Der parteienbezogenen Variante der Hypothese scheint keine Erklärungskraft zuzukommen. Auch die länderbezogene Variante vermag keine systematische Erklärung der EuGH-Rechtsfortbildung zu leisten, die an die Stelle konkurrierender Deutungen treten könnte. Auf ausgewählte Fälle aber passt die länderbezogene Hypothese recht gut. Auf Grundlage der vorgefundenen Ergebnisse formuliere ich die These, dass situative Akte der Politisierung des EuGH möglich erscheinen, ohne dass der rechtliche Code bei der Entscheidungsfindung damit vollständig und dauerhaft vom politischen Code verdrängt würde.

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    Paper provided by Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in its series MPIfG Working Paper with number 10/2.

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    Date of creation: 2010
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgw:p0087
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    1. Martin van Hees & Bernard Steunenberg, 2000. "The Choices Judges Make," Journal of Theoretical Politics, SAGE Publishing, vol. 12(3), pages 305-323, July.
    2. Höpner, Martin, 2004. "Unternehmensmitbestimmung unter Beschuss: Die Mitbestimmungsdebatte im Licht der sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung," MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/8, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    3. Garrett, Geoffrey, 1995. "The politics of legal integration in the European Union," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(01), pages 171-181, December.
    4. Mattli, Walter & Slaughter, Anne-Marie, 1998. "Revisiting the European Court of Justice," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(01), pages 177-209, December.
    5. Caporaso, James A. & Tarrow, Sidney, 2009. "Polanyi in Brussels: Supranational Institutions and the Transnational Embedding of Markets," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(04), pages 593-620, October.
    6. Burley, Anne-Marie & Mattli, Walter, 1993. "Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(01), pages 41-76, December.
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