Regulation in a Political Economy: An explanation of limited commitment of governments in the context of the ratchet effect
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References listed on IDEAS
- Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
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Keywordspolitical economy; endogenous limited commitment; renegotiation; short run contracts;
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
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