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Informalidad: teoría e implicaciones de política

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Mejía

    ()

  • carlos Esteban Posada

    ()

Abstract

En este artículo desarrollamos un modelo de equilibrio general que explica la coexistencia de producciones formal e informal en situaciones de equilibrio estable y de un grado óptimo de imposición estatal (enforcement) de las normas (el pago de un impuesto) que son acatadas por el sector formal y violadas por el informal. La existencia de relaciones no lineales entre la producción y los recursos productivos, las normas públicas de costoso acatamiento y la posibilidad de violarlas (a costa de perder los beneficios que reporta la formalidad) son condiciones de co-existencia de producciones formal e informal en situaciones de equilibrio. Uno de los resultados es éste: si la tarifa efectiva de impuestos se aparta de la óptima las producciones total y formal serán inferiores a las que podría alcanzar la sociedad. Esa pérdida de producción (pérdida de eficiencia estática) es la medida del costo social de la informalidad. Solucionar el problema elevando el grado de enforcement de las normas puede no ser adecuado en vista de que el gasto público en enforcement tiene un costo de oportunidad. Los resultados indican la existencia de un nivel óptimo de enforcement de las normas y de una pena óptima para quien las viole.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Mejía & carlos Esteban Posada, 2007. "Informalidad: teoría e implicaciones de política," Borradores de Economia 455, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
  • Handle: RePEc:bdr:borrec:455
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jay Pil Choi & Marcel Thum, 2005. "Corruption And The Shadow Economy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(3), pages 817-836, August.
    2. Antunes, Antonio R. & Cavalcanti, Tiago V. de V., 2007. "Start up costs, limited enforcement, and the hidden economy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 203-224, January.
    3. Maloney, William F., 1998. "Are labor markets in developing countries dualistic?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1941, The World Bank.
    4. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
    5. Feige, Edgar L., 1990. "Defining and estimating underground and informal economies: The new institutional economics approach," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 18(7), pages 989-1002, July.
    6. Pratap, Sangeeta & Quintin, Erwan, 2006. "The Informal Sector in Developing Countries: Output, Assets and Employment," WIDER Working Paper Series 130, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    7. Dominik H. Enste & Friedrich Schneider, 2000. "Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 77-114, March.
    8. Loayza, Norman V. & Rigolini, Jamele, 2006. "Informality trends and cycles," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4078, The World Bank.
    9. Mincer, Jacob, 1976. "Unemployment Effects of Minimum Wages," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(4), pages 87-104, August.
    10. Maloney, William F, 1999. "Does Informality Imply Segmentation in Urban Labor Markets? Evidence from Sectoral Transitions in Mexico," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 13(2), pages 275-302, May.
    11. Erwan Quintin, 2008. "Contract enforcement and the size of the informal economy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(3), pages 395-416, December.
    12. Masatlioglu Yusufcan & Rigolini Jamele, 2008. "Informality Traps," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-24, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Camilo Mondragón-Vélez & Ximena Peña & Daniel Wills, 2010. "Labor Market Rigidities and Informality in Colombia," ECONOMIA JOURNAL, THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION - LACEA, vol. 0(Fall 2010), pages 65-101, August.
    2. Mesa Callejas, Ramon Javier & Lopez Gonzalez, Mauricio & Gonzalez Henao, Jenifer, 2009. "Medición y características del mercado laboral del Municipio de Rionegro, Antioquia
      [Measurement and characteristics of labor market Rionegro, Antioquia]
      ," MPRA Paper 34507, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Luis Armando Galvis A., 2012. "Informalidad laboral en las áreas urbanas de Colombia," COYUNTURA ECONÓMICA, FEDESARROLLO, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Producción; normas públicas; informalidad; enforcement; gasto Público. Classification JEL: K10; K20; K42; O17.;

    JEL classification:

    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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