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Political Institutions Without Property-Rights Deterioration: Evidence from Coup Attempts, 1950-2024

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  • Alberto Chong

    (Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University and Department of Economics, Universidad del Pacifico, Peru)

Abstract

A large literature treats political and economic institutions as jointly determined, implying that a shock that removes constraints on the executive should weaken both. I test this transmission hypothesis using data for 95 countries from 1950 to 2024. Using complementary causal quasi-experimental designs, I find that coups sharply deteriorate political, legal, and administrative institutions and increase corruption. Against these large responses, however, property rights change little. This is not evidence of inertness: the same property-rights index rises by 0.45 standard deviations following a democratic transition. Coups also move property rights within countries, increasing absolute deviations from pre-coup levels without a common direction. The evidence therefore points to asymmetric institutional adjustment: political constraints can collapse sharply while broad measured property-rights protection remains comparatively persistent.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Chong, 2026. "Political Institutions Without Property-Rights Deterioration: Evidence from Coup Attempts, 1950-2024," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper2632, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper2632
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