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Who Actually Benefits from Changes in Legal Standards? Evidence from Water Disputes in 19th Century California?

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  • Mark Kanazawa

    (Carleton College)

  • Mark T. Kanazawa

Abstract

This paper attempts to answer a fundamental question about the effect of a change in a legal standard on the parties to a dispute: How do we know who is benefited by a change in a legal standard? The answer to this question may seem obvious, particularly if you state it concretely: Who will benefit from a change in a legal standard that is more likely to find drivers at fault in automobile-pedestrian collisions? 1 Surely the answer is pedestrians. Stated more generally, how do we know that a rule change that seems to benefit a class of parties to a dispute actually does?

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Kanazawa & Mark T. Kanazawa, 2017. "Who Actually Benefits from Changes in Legal Standards? Evidence from Water Disputes in 19th Century California?," Working Papers 2017-03, Carleton College, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:avv:wpaper:2017-03
    Note: In Copyright
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    File URL: https://digitalcommons.carleton.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=econ_repec
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Anderson, Terry L & Hill, Peter J, 1975. "The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(1), pages 163-179, April.
    4. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2010. "Pretrial Bargaining with Asymmetric Information: Unilateral versus Bilateral Payoff Relevance," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 369-384, October.
    5. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2010. "Pretrial Bargaining with Asymmetric Information: Unilateral versus Bilateral Payoff Relevance," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 77(2), pages 369-384, October.
    6. Cooter, Robert D & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1989. "Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1067-1097, September.
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