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A rainbow partition theorem for trees and connected maximin share allocations of chores

Author

Listed:
  • Marcin Anholcer
  • Maciej Bartkowiak
  • Bart{l}omiej Bosek
  • Jaros{l}aw Grytczuk
  • Zbigniew Lonc
  • Pawe{l} Rzk{a}.zewski

Abstract

Xiao, Qiu, and Huang (AAMAS 2023) and independently Lonc (personal communication) asked whether indivisible chores located at the vertices of a tree can always be allocated to $n$ agents in connected bundles so that the cost of every agent is at most its connected maximin share; for goods, this is a theorem of Bouveret, Cechl\'arov\'a, Elkind, Igarashi, and Peters. We answer the question affirmatively, even for monotone costs. The answer follows from a combinatorial theorem: if $\mathcal P_1,\ldots,\mathcal P_k$ are partitions of the vertex set of a finite tree, each into at most $k$ connected parts, then the vertex set can be split into disjoint sets $B_1,\ldots,B_k$, some possibly empty, such that each nonempty $B_i$ is connected and contained in a part of $\mathcal P_i$. Equivalently, if each of $k$ colours occurs on at most $k-1$ edges of a tree, then the vertices can be partitioned into connected sets labelled by distinct colours, none containing an edge of its own colour; in particular, one can choose for every colour a component of the forest obtained by deleting that colour so that the chosen components cover the tree. The bound is already best possible for paths, and for additive costs, the theorem is equivalent to the fair-division statement. The proof reduces the problem to inward partitions of oriented trees, which we obtain from the colourful KKM theorem on a simplex of edge weights, using a leaf-elimination labelling that remains compatible when weights vanish. We also give an algorithm running in time $k^{O(k)}$ plus polynomial time.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcin Anholcer & Maciej Bartkowiak & Bart{l}omiej Bosek & Jaros{l}aw Grytczuk & Zbigniew Lonc & Pawe{l} Rzk{a}.zewski, 2026. "A rainbow partition theorem for trees and connected maximin share allocations of chores," Papers 2609.38628, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2609.38628
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hao Guo & Weidong Li & Bin Deng, 2023. "A Survey on Fair Allocation of Chores," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(16), pages 1-28, August.
    2. Eric Budish, 2011. "The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(6), pages 1061-1103.
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