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Convex Order and Moment Persuasion

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  • Xin Wang

Abstract

If a probability measure is a mean-preserving contraction of another, the two measures are said to be in convex order. This paper provides a complete characterization of mean-preserving contractions and their extreme points in the multidimensional setting, extending the results of Kleiner, Moldovanu, Strack, and Whitmeyer (2024) to incorporate fully revealing regions and lower-dimensional pooling regions. A central feature of our characterization is a "concentration " structure: each state can be mapped only to posterior means lying within its own irreducible component. We apply these results to the moment persuasion problem.

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  • Xin Wang, 2026. "Convex Order and Moment Persuasion," Papers 2609.13696, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2609.13696
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack, 2021. "Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(4), pages 1557-1593, July.
    2. Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov & Smorodinsky, Rann & Yamashita, Takuro, 2023. "Optimal persuasion via bi-pooling," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
    3. Dworczak, Piotr & Kolotilin, Anton, 2024. "The persuasion duality," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(4), November.
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