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There Ain't No Such Thing as a Free Equilibrium

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  • Mark Whitmeyer

Abstract

I argue that there is a sense in which universal equilibrium (defined loosely) existence in games is incompatible with eschewing strictly dominated strategies and a sense in which it isn't.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Whitmeyer, 2026. "There Ain't No Such Thing as a Free Equilibrium," Papers 2608.06327, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2608.06327
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    File URL: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2608.06327
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. János Flesch & Dries Vermeulen & Anna Zseleva, 2021. "Legitimate equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(4), pages 787-800, December.
    2. M. Ali Khan & Arthur Paul Pedersen & Maxwell B. Stinchcombe, 2026. "All Games Have Equilibria," Papers 2607.15452, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2026.
    3. Bajoori, Elnaz & Flesch, János & Vermeulen, Dries, 2013. "Perfect equilibrium in games with compact action spaces," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 490-502.
    4. Capraro, Valerio & Scarsini, Marco, 2013. "Existence of equilibria in countable games: An algebraic approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 163-180.
    5. Simon, Leo K & Stinchcombe, Maxwell B, 1995. "Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1421-1443, November.
    6. Stinchcombe, Maxwell B., 2005. "Nash equilibrium and generalized integration for infinite normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 332-365, February.
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