Explainable Graph Neural Networks via Structural Externalities
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2007. "Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 339-356, July.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1977.
"Graphs and Cooperation in Games,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 2(3), pages 225-229, August.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1976. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Discussion Papers 246, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Navarro, Noemi, 2007.
"Fair allocation in networks with externalities,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 354-364, February.
- Noemí Navarro, 2007. "Fair allocation in networks with externalities," Post-Print hal-05113093, HAL.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- René Brink & Dinko Dimitrov & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2021.
"Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(3), pages 509-530, April.
- René van den Brink & Dinko Dimitrov & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2019. "Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies," Post-Print halshs-02346134, HAL.
- René van den Brink & Dinko Dimitrov & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2021. "Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-03153465, HAL.
- René van den Brink & Dinko Dimitrov & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2019. "Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 19018, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- René van den Brink & Dinko Dimitrov & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2021. "Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies," Post-Print hal-03153465, HAL.
- René van den Brink & Dinko Dimitrov & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2019. "Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02346134, HAL.
- René van den Brink & Dinko Dimitrov & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2021. "Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-03153465, HAL.
- Rene van den Brink & Dinko Dimitrov & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2019. "Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-062/II, Tinbergen Institute.
- Ambec, Stefan & Ehlers, Lars, 2008. "Sharing a river among satiable agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 35-50, September.
- Carayol, Nicolas & Delille, Rémy & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2015.
"Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 50-53.
- Nicolas CARAYOL & Remi DELILLE & Vincent VANNETELBOSCH, 2014. "Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation," Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) 2014-05, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA).
- CARAYOL, Nicolas & DELILLE , Rémy & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2015. "Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2717, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Nicolas Carayol & Remy Delille & V. Vannetelbosch, 2015. "Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation," Post-Print hal-03116629, HAL.
- CARAYOL, Nicolas & DELILLE, Rémy & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2014. "Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2014004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Navarro, Noemí, 2010.
"Flexible network rules for identified externalities,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 401-410, July.
- Noemí Navarro, 2010. "Flexible network rules for identified externalities," Post-Print hal-05113094, HAL.
- Funaki, Yukihiko & Núñez, Marina, 2024. "Some advances in cooperative game theory: Indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
- René Van den Brink & Dinko Dimitrov & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2024.
"Power in plurality games,"
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
24014, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Rene van den Brink & Dinko Dimitrov & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2024. "Power in plurality games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 24-076/II, Tinbergen Institute.
- Christophe Bravard & Sudipta Sarangi & ANNE NOUWELAND & MARCO SLIKKER, 2016. "The Position Value for Partition Function Form Network Games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(2), pages 226-247, April.
- Noemí NAVARRO & Róbert VESZTEG, 2007. "Fair ultimatum: an experimental study of the Myerson value," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 07.05, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- Xiaowei Yu & Keith Waehrer, 2024. "Recursive Nash-in-Nash bargaining solution," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 44(1), pages 11-24.
- László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, September.
- Catherine C. Fontenay & Joshua S. Gans, 2014. "Bilateral Bargaining with Externalities," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 756-788, December.
- Jelnov, Artyom & Tauman, Yair, 2009. "The private value of a patent: A cooperative approach," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 84-97, July.
- Skibski, Oskar & Michalak, Tomasz P. & Wooldridge, Michael, 2018. "The Stochastic Shapley Value for coalitional games with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 65-80.
- Noemí Navarro, 2008. "A Sensitive Flexible Network Approach," Working Papers 2008-2, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center, revised Sep 2008.
- Guang Zhang & Erfang Shan & Liying Kang & Yanxia Dong, 2017. "Two efficient values of cooperative games with graph structure based on $$\tau $$ τ -values," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 462-482, August.
- Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Catherine Refait-Alexandre & Guillaume Sekli, 2022.
"Early contributors, cooperation and fair rewards in crowdfunding,"
Working Papers
hal-04222321, HAL.
- Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Catherine Refait-Alexandre & Guillaume Sekli, 2022. "Early contributors, cooperation and fair rewards in crowdfunding," Working Papers 2022-07, CRESE.
- Jean-François Caulier & Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2015.
"An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(2), pages 283-313, October.
- Jean-François Caulier & Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2013. "An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 13063, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Jean-François Caulier & Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2013. "An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00881125, HAL.
- Jean-François Caulier & Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2015. "An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01207823, HAL.
- Jean-François Caulier & Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2013. "An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes," Post-Print halshs-00881125, HAL.
- Jean-François Caulier & Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2015. "An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01207823, HAL.
- Jean-François Caulier & Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2015. "An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes," Post-Print halshs-01207823, HAL.
- Alexandre Skoda, 2016. "Convexity of Network Restricted Games Induced by Minimum Partitions," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 16019, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Béal, Sylvain & Deschamps, Marc & Diss, Mostapha & Tido Takeng, Rodrigue, 2025.
"Cooperative games with diversity constraints,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
- Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Mostapha Diss & Rodrigue Tido Takeng, 2024. "Cooperative games with diversity constraints," Working Papers hal-04447373, HAL.
- Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Mostapha Diss & Rodrigue Tido Takeng, 2025. "Cooperative games with diversity constraints," Post-Print hal-04834011, HAL.
- Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Mostapha Diss & Rodrigue Tido Takeng, 2024. "Cooperative games with diversity constraints," Working Papers 2024-06, CRESE.
- Rodrigo J. Harrison & Roberto Munoz, 2003. "Stability and Equilibrium Selection in a Link Formation Game," Game Theory and Information 0306004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BIG-2025-08-11 (Big Data)
- NEP-GTH-2025-08-11 (Game Theory)
- NEP-NET-2025-08-11 (Network Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2507.17848. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2507.17848.html