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Optimal Regulation and Investment Incentives in Financial Networks

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  • Matthew O. Jackson
  • Agathe Pernoud

Abstract

We examine optimal regulation of financial networks with debt interdependencies between financial firms. We first show that firms often have an incentive to choose excessively risky portfolios and overly correlate their portfolios with those of their counterparties. We then characterize how optimal regulation depends on a firm's financial centrality and its available investment opportunities. In standard core-periphery networks, optimal regulation depends non-monotonically on the correlation of banks' investments, with maximal restrictions for intermediate levels of correlation. Moreover, it can be uniquely optimal to treat banks asymmetrically: restricting the investments of one core bank while allowing an otherwise identical core bank (in all aspects, including network centrality) to invest freely.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew O. Jackson & Agathe Pernoud, 2025. "Optimal Regulation and Investment Incentives in Financial Networks," Papers 2506.16648, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2025.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2506.16648
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Acharya, Viral V., 2009. "A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 224-255, September.
    2. Gofman, Michael, 2017. "Efficiency and stability of a financial architecture with too-interconnected-to-fail institutions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 113-146.
    3. Gara Afonso & Anna Kovner & Antoinette Schoar, 2011. "Stressed, Not Frozen: The Federal Funds Market in the Financial Crisis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(4), pages 1109-1139, August.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
    • F65 - International Economics - - Economic Impacts of Globalization - - - Finance
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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