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RIVCoin: an alternative, integrated, CeFi/DeFi-Vaulted Cryptocurrency

Author

Listed:
  • Roberto Rivera
  • Guido Rocco
  • Massimiliano Marzo
  • Enrico Talin
  • Ammar Elsabe

Abstract

This whitepaper introduces RIV Coin, a cryptocurrency that is fully stabilized by a diversified portfolio of invested reserves that are evaluated by professional independent third parties, and auditable and provable by the protocol. It is born and managed as a decentralized token, minted by a Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO). All wealthier Users are then accepting a redistribution of income, to the benefit of those who have purchased less tokens. In cooperative Game Theory, maximization of the economic benefit of the ecosystem is achieved when players' incentives are perfectly aligned. The proposed model allows for alignment of incentives: decreasing the risk exposure by wealthier Users, but implicitly increasing that of smaller ones to a level perceived by them as still sustainable and never creating ultra-speculative positions. In other words, wealthier Users stabilize the risk associated with the market value of portfolios in which the reserves are invested in Centralized and Decentralized Finance, without falling into the bet scheme. Users indirectly benefit from the access to the rewards of sophisticated cryptocurrency portfolios hitherto precluded to them, as well as having access to a real redistribution of wealth, without this turning into a disadvantage for the wealthy User, who benefits from the greater stability created by the huge influx of smaller Users. Therefore, the progressive growth becomes additional value that tends to stabilize over time, optimizing RIV Coin on the systemic risk level.

Suggested Citation

  • Roberto Rivera & Guido Rocco & Massimiliano Marzo & Enrico Talin & Ammar Elsabe, 2023. "RIVCoin: an alternative, integrated, CeFi/DeFi-Vaulted Cryptocurrency," Papers 2401.05393, arXiv.org, revised May 2025.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2401.05393
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Albert S. Kyle, 1989. "Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(3), pages 317-355.
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