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Golden parachutes under the threat of accidents

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  • Dylan Possamai
  • Chiara Rossato

Abstract

This paper addresses a continuous-time contracting model that extends the problem introduced by Sannikov and later rigorously analysed by Possama\"{i} and Touzi. In our model, a principal hires a risk-averse agent to carry out a project. Specifically, the agent can perform two different tasks, namely to increase the instantaneous growth rate of the project's value, and to reduce the likelihood of accidents occurring. In order to compensate for these costly actions, the principal offers a continuous stream of payments throughout the entire duration of a contract, which concludes at a random time, potentially resulting in a lump-sum payment. We examine the consequences stemming from the introduction of accidents, modelled by a compound Poisson process that negatively impact the project's value. Furthermore, we investigate whether certain economic scenarii are still characterised by a golden parachute as in Sannikov's model. A golden parachute refers to a situation where the agent stops working and subsequently receives a compensation, which may be either a lump-sum payment leading to termination of the contract or a continuous stream of payments, thereby corresponding to a pension.

Suggested Citation

  • Dylan Possamai & Chiara Rossato, 2023. "Golden parachutes under the threat of accidents," Papers 2312.02101, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2312.02101
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Omar El Euch & Thibaut Mastrolia & Mathieu Rosenbaum & Nizar Touzi, 2021. "Optimal make–take fees for market making regulation," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 109-148, January.
    2. Bastien Baldacci & Dylan Possamai & Mathieu Rosenbaum, 2019. "Optimal make take fees in a multi market maker environment," Papers 1907.11053, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
    3. Yuliy Sannikov, 2008. "A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal-Agent Problem," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 75(3), pages 957-984.
    4. Jakša Cvitanić & Dylan Possamaï & Nizar Touzi, 2018. "Dynamic programming approach to principal–agent problems," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 1-37, January.
    5. Bruno Biais & Thomas Mariotti & Jean-Charles Rochet & StÈphane Villeneuve, 2010. "Large Risks, Limited Liability, and Dynamic Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(1), pages 73-118, January.
    6. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
    7. Yiqing Lin & Zhenjie Ren & Nizar Touzi & Junjian Yang, 2020. "Random horizon principal-agent problems," Papers 2002.10982, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
    8. Yuliy Sannikov & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2010. "The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(3), pages 847-882, May.
    9. Sung, Jaeyoung, 1997. "Corporate Insurance and Managerial Incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 297-332, June.
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