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An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Ballot Truncation on Ranked-Choice Electoral Outcomes

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  • Mallory Dickerson
  • Erin Martin
  • David McCune

Abstract

In ranked-choice elections voters cast preference ballots which provide a voter's ranking of the candidates. The method of ranked-choice voting (RCV) chooses a winner by using voter preferences to simulate a series of runoff elections. Some jurisdictions which use RCV limit the number of candidates that voters can rank on the ballot, imposing what we term a truncation level, which is the number of candidates that voters are allowed to rank. Given fixed voter preferences, the winner of the election can change if we impose different truncation levels. We use a database of 1171 real-world ranked-choice elections to empirically analyze the potential effects of imposing different truncation levels in ranked-choice elections. Our general finding is that if the truncation level is at least three then restricting the number of candidates which can be ranked on the ballot rarely affects the election winner.

Suggested Citation

  • Mallory Dickerson & Erin Martin & David McCune, 2023. "An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Ballot Truncation on Ranked-Choice Electoral Outcomes," Papers 2306.05966, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2306.05966
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. D. Marc Kilgour & Jean-Charles Grégoire & Angèle M. Foley, 2020. "The prevalence and consequences of ballot truncation in ranked-choice elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(1), pages 197-218, July.
    2. Kiran Tomlinson & Johan Ugander & Jon Kleinberg, 2022. "Ballot Length in Instant Runoff Voting," Papers 2207.08958, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2022.
    3. Eric Kamwa, 2022. "Scoring Rules, Ballot Truncation, and the Truncation Paradox," Working Papers hal-03632662, HAL.
    4. Eric Kamwa, 2022. "Scoring rules, ballot truncation, and the truncation paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(1), pages 79-97, July.
    5. Peter Fishburn & Steven Brams, 1984. "Manipulability of voting by sincere truncation of preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 397-410, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sanyukta Deshpande & Nikhil Garg & Sheldon Jacobson, 2026. "Simpler than you think: the practical dynamics of ranked choice voting," Journal of Computational Social Science, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 1-48, May.

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